The article is originally published in Khama Press.
Author: Habib Sangar
After nearly a year of diplomatic efforts made by President Ghani’s administration to restore trust and build confidence in the relationship between his country and Pakistan, the most recent wave of suicide attacks, causing a high number of civilian causalities, has brought their peace negotiations to a stalemate. These attacks which killed more than 70 people and wounded hundreds, have widely caused anger and frustration among both the Afghan people and their elected officials towards Pakistan’s government, who has long been accused of providing sanctuary and support for the Taliban.
Since taking office as second elected president, and the first to be handed power through the democratic process, President Ghani took an unprecedented approach in seeking Pakistan’s blessing to bring an end to a one and a half decade-long insurgency in Afghanistan. The level of trust he enshrined towards Pakistan’s government and its military has not only failed to meet and fulfill the desires and aspiration he projected for the prosperity and development of his country and region. To a larger extent, it has eroded the faith his supporters had placed in him. In addition to a course of daily criticisms by citizens, parliamentarians, members of civil society groups and politicians, his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, had publically accused Ghani’s administration of treason in his alleged act of signing the Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan for the sharing of intelligence with ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence). But with the wave of recent attacks, it seems the reserve of patience among Afghans, and president Ghani in particular, has reached its end.
Albeit Pakistan repeatedly denies its involvement in any kind insurgency operations and terroristic attacks on Afghan soil, disclosure of Mullah Omar’s (former leader of the Taliban) death, and the appointment of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor in Pakistan as their new leader, has been a clear indication that Pakistan, based on its outdated militaristic doctrines, support the Taliban as a proxy to destabilize Afghanistan. This would result in the imposition of a government that is Pro-Pakistan and submissive to their agenda.
Pakistan, on other hand, released a statement condemning the recent attacks in Kabul and denied any involvement in providing support to those who claimed responsibility. Similarly, the United States has called on both governments to assist each other in destroying the sanctuaries of terrorist and eliminate the danger that jeopardizes the security and stability of both nations. Speaking only a few hours after Afghanistan’s president accused Pakistan for not going after the Taliban leaders in Pakistan, U.S. State Department spokesman, John Kirby, said that they have no such intelligence to prove the involvement of Pakistan in the capacity that Afghanistan claims. “It is in the urgent interest of both countries to eliminate safe havens and to reduce the operational capacity of the Taliban on both sides of the border,” Kirby said.
Even if the Taliban were to come to the table for negotiations, the likelihood of reaching a peace deal is slim. From an ideological standpoint, the Taliban’s extremist policies and methods for the execution of their principles are not only in contradiction with the Afghan Constitution and Human Rights standards; they are strictly against the values and beliefs for which the United States and its allies have made tremendous sacrifices to instate in Afghanistan. Integration of the Taliban, even if they accept a peace deal, into current regime will be challenging. In comparison to late 2001 and early 2002, Afghanistan has made significant progress in which the integration of Taliban will be nearly impossible, unless the system based upon which the current government is functioning were to be constitutionally revised. Furthermore, public perception toward the Taliban and their supporters, namely Pakistan’s military and ISI, is more negative now than it has ever been. Today, there is a general consensus among the Afghan people, especially among the youth, that the Taliban is fighting a war which is under direct command of Pakistan’s army and ISI. With such a perception of the Taliban as currently exists among the people, the group’s hypothetical reform and reintegration to Afghans society would be seen as dubious and insolvent.
The Bonn Agreement, which laid the foundation of today’s governmental system in Afghanistan, was imbued with certain strategic flaws. Inclusion of the Taliban in the process at that time could have resulted into a peaceful political settlement among all Afghan factions fighting against one another. In addition to perhaps ensuring the legitimacy of the established government from the perspective of Taliban sympathizers, it, however, would have divided the Taliban into two groups. On one side would have been hardliners who still stood by Bin Laden. On the opposing side would be those who would renounce any sort of affiliation with Al Qaeda.
The past is gone and the opportunity is not to be had again. Now the Afghan government, which has claimed and provided evidence of Pakistan’s clandestine influence of terrorist climate in its country for the past ten years, should reach out to other regional countries. Especially, it would be beneficial to befriend China, who is a close ally of Pakistan in the region. Then, relationships with the United States and other world powers could be strengthened to build a joint strategy, based upon the whereabouts of terrorists, their supporters, financial sources, etc.
Even though the presence of the Taliban in these peace talks is important, peace negotiation should directly involve Pakistan, moderated by international community and regional powers under a specific framework. At the same time, the Afghan government should hold off any future talks until all sides involved in the conflict adopt a clear proposed structure for negotiations, which has been validated by the international community. In the absence of such checks and balances, talks will show no results in achieving peace. Pakistan must give assurance that it will take decisive action against insurgent groups, as it vowed to America, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, that it would implement any measures to eliminate Al Qaeda and their affiliates. Likewise, all peace talks should continue to be stalled until Pakistan takes practical steps against those elements, particularly those who were behind the most recent Kabul attacks, and generally those who are against the peace process and continue to kill the Afghan people after emerging from their safe haven in Pakistan.
With credible evidence on hand, the afghan government should approach the United Nations Security Council in order to pressure Pakistan to stop funding and harboring terrorists on its soil. Similarly, the United States, who has greatly suffered from acts of terror- beginning by the deadly attacks of 9/11 on its soil, as well as thousands of losses thereafter in campaign against terrorism, should once again clearly set the red- line such as “you are either with us or against us”. Pakistan should be given the same straight choice that she was given by former president Bush shortly after deadly attacks of 9/11. There’s, once again, a need for a clear confrontation by the United States to ask Pakistan to bring an abrupt end to supporting and sheltering these terrorists, or otherwise it should be treated as “state sponsors terrorism”.
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